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Rural Hospital Ownership: Medical
Service Provision, Market Mix, and
Spillover Effects
Jill R. Horwitz and Austin Nichols
Objective. To test whether nonprofit, for-profit, or government hospital ownership
affects medical service provision in rural hospital markets, either directly or through the
spillover effects of ownership mix.
Data Sources/Study Setting. Data are from the American Hospital Association, U.S.
Census, CMS Healthcare Cost Report Information System and Prospective Payment
System Minimum Data File, and primary data collection for geographic coordinates. The
sample includes all nonfederal, general medical, and surgical hospitals located outside of
metropolitan statistical areas and within the continental United States from 1988 to 2005.
Study Design. We estimate multivariate regression models to examine the effects of
(1) hospital ownership and (2) hospital ownership mix within rural hospital markets on
profitable versus unprofitable medical service offerings.
Principal Findings. Rural nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for-profit hospitals
to offer unprofitable services, many of which are underprovided services. Nonprofits
respond less than for-profits to changes in service profitability. Nonprofits with more forprofit competitors offer more profitable services and fewer unprofitable services than
those with fewer for-profit competitors.
Conclusions. Rural hospital ownership affects medical service provision at the hospital and market levels. Nonprofit hospital regulation should reflect both the direct and
spillover effects of ownership.
Key Words. Hospitals, rural health care, nonprofit, for-profit, hospital markets

The organizational landscape of hospital care in the United States is shifting
once again. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) includes
new regulation of nonprofit hospitals, including community benefit obligations
and billing practice reform (PPACA 2010). Moreover, hospital conversions
from nonprofit to for-profit ownership are on the rise again (Gold 2010). Since
the last spate of conversions in the early 1990s, we have learned a great deal
about the effects of hospital ownership in urban settings. However, despite
claims that hospitals are the heart of rural health systems (Holmes et al. 2006)
1452
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and for-profit ownership may harm rural health services (Moscovice and Stensland 2002), researchers have largely studied ownership in the urban context.
The marked divergence between rural and urban health care makes it
inappropriate to apply findings from one context to the other, and highlights
the need for research into the particular effects of ownership on rural hospitals.
Differences in urban and rural health care can be seen in insurance status
(Lenardson et al. 2009), provider demographics (Reschovsky and Staiti 2005),
case mix and government payment structures (Moscovice and Stensland
2002), and the relatively high government hospital market penetration in rural
markets (Table 1). For these reasons, as well as the fact that roughly half of all
U.S. hospitals are located outside of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), we
examine the direct and spillover effects of hospital ownership on the availability of medical services in rural areas.
First, we provide new descriptive information on for-profit and nonprofit
market share in rural markets. We also identify systematic differences in the
characteristics of geographic areas in which for-profits and nonprofits locate,
patterns that are particularly important to consider when analyzing the effects
of rural hospital ownership on hospital behavior. Previous studies concluding
that rural for-profit hospitals have better controlled labor and other operating
costs (McCue 2007) or are otherwise more efficient (Ferrier and Valdmanis
1996) than either nonprofit or government hospitals acknowledge the importance of location. But these studies address neither the variation in population
density within nonurban areas nor related selection effects. Second, using
regression analysis, we identify two distinct types of ownership effects: (1) the
direct effects of a rural hospital’s own ownership on medical service offerings
and (2) the spillover effects of the market mix of hospital types on a hospital’s
service offering.
Our strongest findings suggest that nonprofit hospitals are more likely
than rural for-profit hospitals to offer unprofitable services, many of which are
in short supply in rural areas. Nonprofits are also less responsive than forprofits to changes in medical service profitability. Moreover, nonprofit hospitals located in areas with more for-profit competitors act more like for-profit
hospitals in terms of service offerings than do nonprofits located in areas with
fewer for-profit competitors. It is unclear, however, whether these similarities
are because nonprofits must make up for lost revenue due to cream skimming
Address correspondence to Jill R. Horwitz, Ph.D., J.D., M.P.P., University of Michigan Law
School, 625 S. State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; e-mail: jrhorwit@umich.edu. Austin Nichols,
Ph.D., M.P.P., Senior Research Associate, is with the Urban Institute, NW Washington, DC.

1454

HSR: Health Services Research 46:5 (October 2011)

Table 1: Hospital Ownership (1988–2005) by Year and Rural Status
Urban, Unweighted
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Average of
all years

Urban, Weighted
by Admissions

Rural, Unweighted

Rural, Weighted
by Admissions

Gov

NFP

FP

Gov

NFP

FP

Gov

NFP

FP

Gov

NFP

FP

17.91
17.69
17.67
17.39
17.83
18.27
18.11
17.61
17.64
16.87
16.28
16.34
15.72
15.98
15.93
15.75
15.79
15.60
16.91

64.46
64.79
65.22
65.94
65.62
65.05
64.51
64.60
64.36
63.81
64.89
65.68
66.01
65.72
65.69
65.24
64.58
65.18
65.08

17.63
17.52
17.10
16.67
16.54
16.67
17.37
17.79
18.00
19.32
18.83
17.98
18.27
18.30
18.38
19.00
19.63
19.22
18.01

17.39
16.93
16.80
16.24
16.27
16.68
16.80
16.21
15.75
14.83
14.00
13.91
13.25
13.55
13.67
13.30
13.54
13.45
15.14

73.12
73.56
73.74
74.51
74.43
73.95
73.03
72.87
72.54
72.66
73.54
74.17
74.43
74.24
73.95
74.16
73.69
73.97
73.70

9.49
9.51
9.46
9.25
9.29
9.38
10.18
10.93
11.71
12.50
12.46
11.92
12.31
12.21
12.37
12.54
12.77
12.58
11.16

43.17
43.16
43.13
43.58
43.73
43.60
42.05
43.00
42.83
41.50
40.68
40.33
39.76
39.52
38.76
38.64
38.43
38.24
41.34

47.63
47.81
48.02
47.71
48.41
48.74
50.35
48.84
48.94
49.98
50.67
51.10
51.83
52.11
52.67
52.27
52.00
51.95
50.06

9.20
9.03
8.85
8.71
7.85
7.66
7.60
8.16
8.23
8.52
8.65
8.56
8.41
8.37
8.57
9.09
9.57
9.81
8.60

32.00
31.68
31.63
31.02
31.16
30.82
26.55
30.22
29.54
28.49
27.82
27.21
26.83
26.56
25.70
25.09
25.33
25.12
28.49

58.37
58.51
58.53
59.01
59.84
60.16
65.74
59.85
60.18
60.80
61.57
61.89
61.98
62.28
62.89
62.65
62.11
62.19
61.03

9.62
9.82
9.83
9.97
9.00
9.02
7.72
9.92
10.28
10.71
10.62
10.90
11.19
11.16
11.41
12.25
12.56
12.70
10.48

Notes. Includes all general, medical, and surgical hospitals except Veterans’, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Department of Justice (prison), and other federal or restricted use hospitals. Rural hospitals
are defined as those hospitals located outside of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and urban
hospitals are defined as those located within MSAs.
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Hospital Association Annual Surveys 1988–2005.

by for-profit hospitals or because the characteristics of those markets favor that
type of behavior. Given both the recent increase in hospital conversions and
debate at all levels of government regarding whether nonprofit hospitals merit
their tax exemptions, these results are both timely and important for understanding the potential effects of nonprofit and tax policy for health policy.

DATA
Hospital data are from the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual
Surveys of Hospitals.1 We construct control variables for market demographics
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using tract-level data from the U.S. Census (1990 and 2000). Hospital reimbursement status variables are from the CMS Healthcare Cost Report Information System and the Prospective Payment System Minimum Data File. HMO
data (1990–2001) are from the National Directory of HMOs and Interstudy (see
Baker 1997 for details). We construct the hospital system membership variable
from (1) the AHA and (2) databases by Madison (2004) and Dafny and Dranove
(2006). Finally, we rely on a hospital address and coordinate database we constructed from the AHA, geocoding software, and extensive primary research.
Hospital Population, Key Study Variables, and Market Definitions
We include all nonfederal, general medical, and surgical hospitals in the continental United States in the study. We define rural hospitals as all those that
fall outside of MSAs, a characterization typical of rural hospital research. As
discussed below, we also include a control variable to account for varying
degrees of rural status based on population density.
Our dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether a hospital
offers a medical service. We examine all acute and postacute medical service
reported in the AHA, which includes approximately 80 service questions; we
exclude questions about facilities, nonmedical services, and duplicate questions (see Appendices SA2, SA3, and SA4 for a full list of services). We also
exclude services that fewer than 3 percent of rural hospitals offer over the
whole study period (including profitable services, e.g., open heart surgery, and
unprofitable services, e.g., burn units) as well as services for which a majority
of years are missing. This leaves 37 medical services.
Drawing on extensive prior research, we categorize the medical services
as relatively high, relatively low, or variably profitable over the study period
(Horwitz 2005a, b). We do not know the accuracy of these designations for each
individual hospital or market; however, they are consistent with expert views,
scholarship, and federal and state policy. Two advantages of the approach are
(1) the designations rely in part on market perceptions rather than whether the
services proved to be profitable ex post, thereby reflecting decisions to invest in
service lines; and (2) our results do not rely on the designation of any single
service but on comparisons among all major medical services.
The key explanatory variable for estimating the effects of hospital ownership on a hospital’s own output is a dummy variable for nonprofit, for-profit,
or government ownership. The key explanatory variable in estimating spillover effects is the interaction between ownership and for-profit market share.
Using each hospital’s longitude and latitude, we define a hospital’s market

1456

HSR: Health Services Research 46:5 (October 2011)

based on the distance to each potential competitor. We report results using a
‘‘distance-weighted’’ market measure, one that identifies the percent of all
other potentially competing hospitals (i.e., all hospitals in the nation weighted
by their distance, more or less as ‘‘the crow flies,’’ from the observation hospital) that are for-profit.2 Elsewhere we have shown this procedure produces
results equivalent to less precise approaches to defining markets such as radii
around a hospital’s zip code or MSA (Horwitz and Nichols 2007).
Because a large proportion of hospitals are not located near a for-profit,
we define ‘‘for-profit markets’’ as being in a ‘‘high for-profit market’’ (High-FP
Mkt) if at least 5 percent of nearby hospitals’ admissions are at a for-profit (i.e.,
the mean of neighbors’ for-profit status weighted proportionally to admissions
and approximately inversely proportionally to distance exceeds 0.05).3
Thirty-six percent of rural hospitals are in a for-profit market. Seventy-one
percent of for-profits, 43 percent of government, and 26 percent of nonprofits
are located in a for-profit market. This definition excludes the hospital’s own
status, so the differential implies that rural for-profit hospitals are more likely to
be located near other for-profit hospitals than are rural nonprofit hospitals.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The Direct Effects of Ownership on Rural Hospitals
Service-Level Specification. In our main specification, we include all medical
services provided at all hospitals in the sample in a single regression where each
observation is a medical service–hospital–year combination. For reasons
discussed in detail below, all of our main specifications are cross-sectional; in
sensitivity testing, also described below, we use fixed-effects models. We regress
service provision on hospital, market, and service characteristics as follows:
EðServiceProvidedÞijt ¼ bo þ b1 Fit þ b2 Yt þ b3 Hit þ b4 Djt þ b5 Rjt
þ b6 Pjt þ b7 Fit Pjt

ð1Þ

where j indexes medical services, i indexes hospitals, and t indexes year. The
matrix F contains a set of indicator variables for nonprofit, for-profit, or
government ownership. The matrix Y contains a set of dummy variables
for years. Control variables in Hit include hospital characteristics and
other variables described below. D includes demographic characteristics of
the hospital’s potential patient population, as described below.
Pjt is an indicator of service profitability (0 for unprofitable, 1 for profitable
each year). The key variable is Fit Pjt (coefficient b7), the interaction between
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ownership and service profitability, which suggests the probability of a hospital
of a given type to offer relatively profitable and unprofitable services. In this
model, we include all 31 services classified as either profitable or unprofitable,
excluding the six services of indeterminate profitability. We code services with
variable profitability as either profitable or unprofitable depending on the year.
To control for potential confounding factors, we include a set of hospital,
market, and payment characteristics. Hospital characteristics, H, include
(1) hospital size (measured by quintiles of hospital admissions, which is a
better measure of size than the number of beds in a hospital because beds may
or may not be filled and may or may not be licensed), (2) teaching status
(measured by membership in residency training organizations), and (3) hospital
system membership.
We also include the market penetration of HMOs, as a proxy
for competitive pressure. We include two variables to control for market
concentration, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (sum of squares of each hospital’s
annual share of total admissions within each state among rural hospitals only),
and whether the state has 2, 3, 4, or 5 or more rural hospitals.
We include D, a vector of demographic variables, measuring the
characteristics of a hospital’s potential patients, including population
measures of size, age, education, race, sex, marital status by sex, employed
persons by industry (as a proxy for insurance status), household income, income
per capita, and travel time to work (as a proxy for willingness to drive to the
hospital). Because these data were from the decennial censuses, we linearly
interpolate and extrapolate the natural log of each control variable. We compile
these data from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses by averaging across all tracts in the
states and DC, using weights that vary inversely with the distance squared from
hospital i to the centroid of each census tract.
R includes two sets of variables that address the unique nature of rural
hospital markets and payments. First, we include a dummy variable for each
quartile of 1989 population density in the vicinity of a hospital, weighted as with
other Census-based controls so a nearer tract’s population density contributes
more than more distant tracts. These variables proxy for the degree of ruralness
in the market and reflect the fact that there is a spectrum of market types
between rural and urban designations.
Second, R includes dummy variables for federal designation as a Critical
Access Hospital (CAH), a CMS program that reimburses hospitals through a
cost-based rather than prospective-payment system.4 Including the CAH
variable is important because participating hospitals tend to have considerably
higher revenues, expenses, and profit margins, particularly associated with
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outpatient care, than nonparticipating hospitals.5 Moreover, although some
CAHs are for-profit——none in early years, 41 for-profit hospitals in 2005, and
2 percent of our sample overall——CAHs are typically nonprofit (Pink et al. 2006)
or government hospitals. Eight percent of the nonprofit and 9 percent of the
government hospitals in our sample were CAHs.
To further account for potential differences in reimbursement status, we
include indicator variables to sole community hospitals (SCHs) or Medicaredependent hospitals (MDHs) designation.6 Because PPACA extends some of
these rural payment programs, they will likely continue to affect rural medical
service provision (PPACA 2010, Part II).
Because the probability of a hospital offering a service is not independent
from one year to the next, we correct standard errors by clustering at the
hospital level, a conservative choice, so they are robust to arbitrary serial
correlation (Arellano 1987; Kézdi 2004; Stock and Watson 2006). These clusterrobust standard errors are also robust to heteroskedasticity in errors.
Individual Service, Hospital-Level Specification. We also estimated a separate
probit for each of the medical services in our study. We estimated a hospitallevel specification to ask whether hospital types (nonprofit, for-profit,
government) offer different types of medical services as follows:
EðServiceProvidedÞit ¼F ðbo þ b1 Fit þ b2 Yt þ b3 Yt Fit
þ b4 Hit þ b5 Dit þ b6 Rit Þ

ð2Þ

where i indexes hospitals, t indexes year, and F( ) is the probit function. All
other variables are as described above.
After estimating the effect of ownership using equation (2), we predict the
probabilities reported in Appendices SA2, SA3, and SA4 by varying only the
corporate form and market type of each hospital observed in the middle year of
1996 while holding the independent variables constant (at 1996 levels). We then
average the individual predicted probabilities to obtain the probability that a
hospital type offers a service each year. Conducting the empirical tests in this
manner allows us to hold constant nonownership hospital characteristics, thus
yielding more accurate predictions of how hospitals would behave if they
changed form and no other attributes.
The Spillover Effects of Ownership on Rural Hospitals
Service-Level Specification. We then estimate a spillover-based specification in
which we whether hospital types offer different types of services in different
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market types measured by for-profit penetration, modeling the effect of
ownership mix on service provision by hospital type as follows:
EðServiceProvidedÞijt ¼ bo þ b1 Fit þ b2 Yt þ b3 Hit þ b4 Djt þ b5 Rjt
þ b7 Fit FPMarketit þ b8 Pjt þ b9 Fit Pjt
þ b10 Pijt Fit FPMarketit

ð3Þ

where all the variables are the same as in equation (1) above, with the addition
of variables to account for ownership spillover effects. We include FPMarket,
an indicator variable for high for-profit markets, interacted with the hospital’s
own ownership type (matrix F). The key additional variable, Pijt Fit
FPMarketit (coefficient b10), measures the differential impact of profitability
for a hospital of a given type between low and high for-profit markets. As in the
previous model, we correct standard errors by clustering at the hospital level.
Single Service, Hospital-Level Specification. Finally, we estimate a market-level
model to the probability of a hospital offering each individual service,
analogous to the hospital-level specification in equation (2)
EðServiceProvidedÞit ¼bo þ b1 Fit þ b2 Yt þ b3 Yt Fit þ b4 Hit þ b5 Dit
þ b6 Rit þ b7 FPMarketit þ b8 Fit FPMarketit

ð4Þ

þ b9 Yt Fit FPMarketit
As with the results from equation (2), we use the estimates to predict the effects
of ownership and market mix on service provision by varying only the
corporate form and market type of each hospital observed in the middle year
of 1996 while holding the independent variables constant (at 1996 levels). We
then average the individual predicted probabilities to obtain the probability
that a hospital type offers a service each year.

RESULTS
Descriptive Results
Like their urban counterparts, most rural hospitals are nonprofit. The distribution of ownership types, however, differs considerably. Rural hospitals are
less likely than nonrural hospitals to be either nonprofit or for-profit corporations (see Table 1). From 1988 to 2005, rural hospitals were 50.06 percent
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nonprofit, 41.34 percent government, and only 8.60 percent for-profit owned.
Weighting by hospital admissions to account for hospital size, rural hospitals
were 61.03 percent nonprofit, 28.49 percent government, and 10.48 percent
for-profit owned. As this distribution implies, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals
tend to be larger than government hospitals.
Not surprisingly, rural hospitals are farther from their nearest potential
competitor (the nearest hospital) than are urban hospitals. Rural for-profits are
closer to their nearest competitors than are either government or nonprofit hospitals, although these differences are not large. Half of for-profits
face a nearest competitor 12 miles away or less, whereas half of nonprofits
have their nearest competitor 15 miles away or less. Further, rural are
more likely than nonrural for-profits to operate near another for-profit; rural
are less likely than urban nonprofits to have a for-profit nearest neighbor.
These geographic differences suggest different competitive strategies in rural
and urban settings.
Direct Effects of Ownership Type. For-profit hospitals offer fewer services than
do nonprofit hospitals in rural markets, even controlling for hospital size and
the other factors listed above, but the difference is much more pronounced for
unprofitable services. This can be seen in Table 2a, where a negative
coefficient on for-profit hospital (FP Hospital) indicates lower probability of
offering an unprofitable service than reference group nonprofit hospitals, and
the coefficient on the interaction with profitable service is not large enough to
offset that negative coefficient.
Nonprofit hospitals are less likely than for-profit hospitals and more likely
than government hospitals to offer profitable services. This can also be seen
in Tables 2a and b where coefficients on the interactions between the
dummy variable of service profitability (ProfServ) with ownership types are
all negative for the interactions with government hospital ownership and
positive for the interactions with for-profit ownership type. We present
estimates from linear regressions to facilitate comparisons with the fixed effect
results with minimal distributional assumptions; generalized linear models
tailored to binary outcomes produce similar marginal effects estimates.
To help illustrate our results, we present two examples from the
specifications in which we tested the relationship between ownership and
service provision by each individual service (equation [2]). Although the
results for many of the services are similar, particularly for unprofitable
services, there is some variation in the results by service. For a full list of the
results by service see Appendices SA2, SA3, and SA4.
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Table 2a: Provision of More and Less Profitable Services by Hospital Ownership, 1988–2005
Dependent Variable 5 Probability of Offering Medical Service
(1)
No Fixed
Effects
Profitable Service  0.0221nnn
(  6.25)
FP Hospital
 0.0867nnn
(  11.82)
FP Hospital 
0.0669nnn
ProfServ
(7.35)
Gov Hospital
 0.0189nnn
(  4.13)
Gov Hospital   0.0191nnn
ProfServ
(  4.08)
Fixed effects
None
Dem. & rural
All
controls
Observations
1,098,981
Clustered
By hospital

(2)
No Fixed
Effects

(3)
Hospital Fixed
Effects

(4)
Hospital/Service
Fixed Effects

(5)
Hospital/Service
Fixed Effects

 0.0221nnn
(  6.25)
 0.0943nnn
(  12.88)
0.0669nnn
(7.34)
 0.0224nnn
(  4.85)
 0.0191nnn
(  4.08)
None
Limited

 0.0221nnn
0.0619nnn
0.0619nnn
(  6.26)
(12.82)
(13.70)
 0.0339nnn
 0.0273nnn
 0.0273nnn
(  4.64)
(  3.37)
(  4.59)
0.0669nnn
0.0518nnn
0.0518nnn
(7.34)
(4.70)
(6.16)
0.0140nnn
0.0123nn
0.0123nnn
(3.02)
(2.43)
(3.06)
 0.0190nnn
 0.0155nnn
 0.0155nnn
(  4.06)
(  2.64)
(  3.11)
Hospital
Hospital/service Hospital/service
Limited
Limited
Limited

1,098,981
By hospital

1,098,981
By hospital

1,098,981
By hospital

1,098,981
By service

Notes. The unit of observation is the service-hospital-year. The specification in column 1 corresponds
to equation (1). The results in column (2) and the fixed-effects specifications reported in columns (3)–
(5) correspond to equation (1), with the exception that they do not include demographic or rural
control variables as they would contribute noise to the estimation and increase measurement error
bias, given the fixed effects structure; column (2), which reports the cross-sectional results with the
same limited control variables as columns (3)–(5), is offered for comparison to column (1). All
specifications are estimated as linear regressions. t-Statistics in parentheses.
nnn
Significant at the 1 percent level.
nn
Significant at the 5 percent level.
n
Significant at the 10 percent level.

For-profit are less likely than nonprofit and government hospitals to
offer psychiatric emergency care, a service that was unprofitable relative to
other services throughout the study period. On average from 1988 to 2005 in
rural areas, for-profit hospitals were almost 9-percentage points less likely
than nonprofit hospitals (12.78 versus 21.62 percent, po.01) to offer
psychiatric emergency services7 (see Appendix SA3). Nonprofit hospitals
were not significantly more likely than government hospitals (21.62 versus
18.36 percent, p4.10) to offer psychiatric emergency services (see Appendix
SA3). It is easiest to see this graphically in Figure 1.
A second example is also instructive. The profitability of home health care
varied dramatically over the study period. During the time that home health was
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Table 2b: Provision of More and Less Profitable Services by Hospital Ownership and Market Type, 1988–2005
Dependent Variable 5 Probability of Offering Medical Service
(1)
No Fixed
Effects

(2)
No Fixed
Effects

(3)
Hospital
Fixed Effects

(4)
Hospital/Service
Fixed Effects

(5)
Hospital/Service
Fixed Effects

Gov Hospital &
ProfServ
HiFP Mkt &
Gov Hosp & ProfServ
HiFP Mkt &
Gov Hosp & Unprof Serv
HiFP Mkt &
FP Hosp & ProfServ
HiFP Mkt & FP Hosp
& UnprofServ
HiFP Mkt & NFP Hosp
& ProfServ
HiFP Mkt & NFP Hosp
& Unprof Serv

 0.0298nnn
(  7.36)
 0.103nnn
(  7.62)
0.0950nnn
(5.46)
 0.0169nnn
(  3.03)
 0.0230nnn
(  3.93)
 0.0138nnn
(  2.86)
 0.0413nnn
(  7.75)
 0.0305nn
(  2.30)
 0.00163
(  0.11)
 0.0259nnn
(  4.50)
 0.0558nnn
(  8.42)

 0.0298nnn
(  7.36)
 0.109nnn
(  8.02)
0.0948nnn
(5.44)
 0.0189nnn
(  3.36)
 0.0230nnn
(  3.93)
 0.0163nnn
(  3.39)
 0.0438nnn
(  8.16)
 0.0314nn
(  2.31)
 0.00264
(  0.18)
 0.0302nnn
(  5.29)
 0.0601nnn
(  8.99)

 0.0299nnn
(  7.38)
 0.0451nnn
(  3.39)
0.0948nnn
(5.44)
0.0184nnn
(3.34)
 0.0229nnn
(  3.91)
0.0115nnn
(2.74)
 0.0160nnn
(  3.96)
 0.0165
(  1.31)
0.0122
(0.94)
0.0179nnn
(3.84)
 0.0122nnn
(  2.73)

0.0538nnn
(10.60)
 0.0325nnn
(  2.61)
0.0666nnn
(4.99)
0.0142nn
(2.38)
 0.0144nn
(  2.22)
0.00764n
(1.86)
 0.0125nnn
(  3.12)
 0.00283
(  0.27)
0.000319
(0.03)
0.0150nnn
(3.78)
 0.0101nn
(  2.37)

Fixed Effects
Dem. & Rural Controls
Observations
Clustered

None
All
1,098,981
By hospital

None
Limited
1,098,981
By hospital

Hospital
Limited
1,098,981
By hospital

Hospital/service
Limited
1,098,981
By hospital

0.0538nnn
(11.45)
 0.0325nnn
(  3.93)
0.0666nnn
(5.56)
0.0142nnn
(3.15)
 0.0144nnn
(  2.59)
0.00764nn
(2.25)
 0.0125nnn
(  3.80)
 0.00283
(  0.35)
0.000319
(0.04)
0.0150nnn
(4.42)
 0.0101nnn
(  3.04)
(17.87)
Hospital/service
Limited
1,098,981
By service

Profitable Service
FP Hospital
FP Hospital &
ProfServ
Gov Hospital

Notes. The unit of observation is the service-hospital-year. The specification in column 1 corresponds
to equation (3). The regression in column (2) and the fixed-effects specifications reported in columns
(3)–(5) correspond to equation (3), with the exception that they do not include demographic or rural
control variables as they would contribute noise to the estimation and increase measurement error
bias, given the fixed effects structure; column (2), which reports the cross-sectional results with the
same limited control variables as columns (3)–(5), is offered for comparison to column (1). All
specifications are estimated as linear regressions. t-Statistics in parentheses.
nnn
Significant at the 1 percent level.
nn
Significant at the 5 percent level.
n
Significant at the 10 percent level.

a profitable service (1988–1997), the likelihood a for-profit hospital offered
home health rose more than threefold (the chance was 3.3 times as high, rising
from under 20 to over 66 percent), while it nearly doubled at nonprofit hospitals
(increasing from 35 to 65 percent; this difference in growth is statistically
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Figure 1: Proportion Rural Hospitals Offering Services, 1988–2005,
Regression Adjusted
PSYCH. EMERGENCY SERVICES
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Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the American Hospital Association Annual Surveys,
1988–2005.
Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all rural, general medical and surgical hospitals and
control for all variables listed in the text.

significant, po.01), and more than doubled at government hospitals (increasing
from 27 to 63 percent, po.01). As profitability decreased (from 1997 to 2005),
the probability of offering home health care halved among for-profits (67–33
percent), but declined modestly at nonprofit (falling from 65 to 58 percent,
po.01) and government hospitals (falling from 63 to 59 percent, po.01) (see
Appendix SA4).
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Ownership Mix and Spillover Effects. We also identify the indirect effects of
hospital ownership on medical service offerings by examining the relationship
between the mix of ownership types in rural markets and service offerings.
Without any fixed effects, we find that nonprofit hospitals in markets with
higher for-profit market penetration are less likely to offer unprofitable
services than nonprofits in markets with lower for-profit penetration (Table 2b,
columns [1] and [2], coefficient on HiFP Mkt  NFP Hosp  Unprof Serv).
Without any fixed effects, we find that nonprofit hospitals in markets
with higher for-profit penetration are also less likely to offer profitable services
than nonprofits in markets with lower for-profit penetration (Table 2b,
columns [1] and [2], coefficient on HiFP Mkt  NFP Hosp  Prof Serv).
However, these results are not robust. Indeed, in the fixed effects tests
(columns 3–5) the sign flips. This could be because markets in which
ownership is in flux are different from more stable markets, or it could more
accurately reflect the causal effect if the identification is superior using fixed
effects to sweep out time-invariant differences across hospitals and/or services.
Nonprofits consistently, in markets with either high or low for-profit
penetration, do not contribute to the fixed effects estimates, so if the former
are less likely to offer profitable services and the latter more likely due to
historical factors and the differential service provision has actually induced the
difference in for-profit penetration, the regressions without fixed effects could
incorrectly attribute this cross-sectional difference to and effect of the market
penetration rather the reverse.
The estimates from the individual service regressions were mixed.
Although we find no clear pattern in the propensity to offer profitable services
across market types, nonprofits with relatively few for-profit competitors were
more likely to offer many unprofitable services such as psychiatric, hospice,
substance abuse, and social work services (Appendices SA2, SA3, and SA4,
columns 6 and 7). In addition, nonprofits in markets with more for-profit
competition were more profit seeking in their provision of services where
profits varied over time.
As with the direct effects results, it is easiest to understand the results by
looking at representative services. On average over the study period,
nonprofits in high for-profit markets were predicted to be 8.2-percentage
points less likely to offer psychiatric emergency care than those in low forprofit markets (15.50 versus 23.27 percent, po.01) (see Appendix SA3).
In addition, nonprofits in for-profit markets were more responsive to
financial incentives than other nonprofits. Nonprofits were more likely to offer
home health services over time in both high and low for-profit markets during
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Figure 2: Proportion Rural Hospitals Offering Services, 1988–2005,
Regression Adjusted and by Market Type
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Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the American Hospital Association Annual Surveys,
1988–2005.
Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all rural, general medical and surgical hospitals and
control for all variables listed in the text.

the profitable period of 1988–1997), but rose more dramatically in high forprofit markets (43.5–68.4 percent compared with 34.8–63.4 percent,
Appendix SA4). As profit-making fell after 1997, nonprofits were less likely
to offer home health in both types of markets, but the fall was more dramatic in
high for-profit markets (falling from 68.4 to 60.0 percent instead of 63.4 to 56.7
percent, see Appendix SA). Nonprofits were more likely to offer home health
in high than low for-profit markets during the profitable period (1988–1997)
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and less likely to offer it in high than low for-profit markets during the
unprofitable period (post-1997) (Figure 2, panel 4), though the difference
between high and low for-profit markets in the nonprofit likelihood of offering
home health during 1993–1997 is only marginally significant (p 5 .586).
Fixed Effects Models and Other Robustness Checks
The biggest challenge to studying hospital ownership is potential endogeneity
of hospital location. We cannot rule out the possibility that an unobserved
market trait——one which attracts for-profit hospitals and causes them to specialize in profitable services——explains our results. However, there are several
reasons to suggest we have identified the effects of ownership. It is likely that
the detailed demographic control variables used in our estimations are correlated with unobserved market demand characteristics. Moreover, although
hospitals do open, close, and convert among ownership forms, market share
changes little over time (Santerre and Vernon 2005) and is related primarily to
historical and social characteristics (Grabowski and Hirth 2002; for more
detail see Horwitz and Nichols 2007, 2009).
Nonetheless, we conducted additional analyses to test the robustness of
our results. First, we redefined market type (high versus low for-profit market)
based on the for-profit market penetration of the first year a hospital is observed in our data (typically 1988). The unreported results differ only modestly, suggesting that they do not reflect selective for-profit entry in markets
with relatively high demand for profitable services.
Second, we implement specifications using hospital and hospital-service
fixed-effects. In all fixed effects specifications we exclude the demographic
and rural payment and population control variables because these variables
are unlikely to change much over the sample period and, therefore, including
them would likely only contribute noise to the estimates. Excluding the variables do not materially change the results in the cross-sectional specifications
(compare columns [1] and [2] in Tables 2a and b).
In the fixed effects regressions much of the identification comes from
changes in for-profit market share, although service profitability and ownership
also change over time. Although fixed effects models may address locational
endogeneity, it can be difficult to generalize from their results because markets
and hospitals that change ownership form, particularly from nonprofit to forprofit ownership, are likely different from other hospitals and markets.
Nonetheless, the fixed effects estimates results support our findings. For
example, for-profit hospitals are less likely to offer unprofitable services (Table
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2b, column 2, row 2) and more likely to offer profitable services (Table 2b,
column 2, row 3) than nonprofits in a low for-profit-penetration market. Similarly, the hospital-service-level fixed effects, which identify the effects off of
services that change profitability in hospitals that change form, also support the
results. Again, nonprofits are more likely than for-profits to offer these services
when profitable, and less likely than for-profits to offer them when unprofitable
(Table 2b, columns 3 and 4, row 2), and more likely to offer profitable services
(Table 2b, columns 3 and 4, row 3) than nonprofits in a low for-profit-penetration.
Finally, some of our findings regarding the spillover effects of ownership
are also supported by the fixed effects results. Nonprofit hospitals are more
likely to offer profitable services in high for-profit penetration markets (Table
2b, columns 2 and 3, row 10) and less likely to offer unprofitable services in
high for-profit penetration markets (row 11). Government hospitals also appear more likely to offer profitable services and less likely to offer unprofitable
services in markets with high for-profit penetration (rows 6 and 7), though the
apparent effects are not always statistically significant.

DISCUSSION
Despite the importance of identifying the relationship between ownership and
medical services, ownership has not been studied previously among rural
hospitals. Patient treatment is constrained by the range of services a hospital
chooses to offer. Knowing whether and how ownership determines the availability of services, therefore, contributes to an understanding of access to
medical care. Moreover, hospital administrators may more readily control
service offerings than ownership status, market environment, physician
behavior, or patient selection.
Our approach demonstrates that ownership affects service delivery, a finding
that is often obscured by the research design typically used in ownership studies.
For example, a study may conclude that patient mortality is the same at for-profit
and nonprofit hospitals——even controlling for factors such as billing practices,
capacity, staff, the patient pool, market characteristics, and service offerings. Such a
study, however, would not allow one to conclude that ownership does not matter
because it would mask the fact that nonprofits and for-profits offer different
services, and these differences might matter a great deal for quality and access.
Further, even if the hospital types did not differ in service offerings——
although we find that they do a great deal——the presence of nonprofits or
for-profits in a market could, as we find, affect the distribution of services
offered in a market. Therefore, the mix of ownership types could have
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important consequences for the well-being of patients, government finances,
returns on investment, and the economic efficiency of the market. Understanding the size of these potential effects is a necessary prerequisite to evaluating the potential benefits of different market structures for hospital care.
Yet policy makers, particularly those focused on tax exemption, have
been focused elsewhere. As mentioned above, PPACA includes new requirements for nonprofit hospitals to maintain their federal tax exempt status such
as conducting community health needs assessment every 3 years and implementing programs to address these needs. In addition, PPACA requires nonprofit hospitals to develop financial assistance policies, refrain from engaging
in extraordinary collection activities, and limit billing before determining
patients’ eligibility for financial assistance. Whether these new rules will limit
charges in practice is uncertain as PPACA includes a substantial modification
to the original language in the Act: whereas section 9007 forbids nonprofit
hospitals from charging individuals eligible for financial assistance who
receive emergency or medically necessary care an amount ‘‘more than the
lowest amounts charged to individuals who have insurance coverage,’’ Section
10904 of the Act modifies this restriction by allowing hospitals to charge no
more than ‘‘the amounts generally billed.’’
Investigations have largely centered on the differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, particularly in the financial treatment of indigent
patients (Grassley 2006; Pear 2006). However, differences in the amount of
charity care provision are not the most significant differences in nonprofit and
for-profit hospital behavior. Therefore, a tax policy too focused on charity care
levels could be counter-productive for health policy because it may decrease
resources available for other beneficial but low-profit, undersupplied medical
services, particularly in rural areas that are already poorly served.
Policy proposals addressing hospital ownership, therefore, should be
evaluated not only according to their effect on nonprofit hospital behavior.
Rather, regulators should consider the reactions of competitors in mixedownership markets, which unfortunately, are not well understood. It may be
that a nonprofit’s biggest contribution is not that it offers underprovided services but that its presence influences the behavior of its for-profit competitors.
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NOTES
1. The AHA data have several limitations. First, they are self-reported and the survey
format changed slightly over the years. From 1988 to 1993, it asked hospitals
whether each service was offered at the hospital, another hospital, or not at all.
Later surveys asked hospitals to answer four separate questions regarding whether
the service was available at the hospital or at various affiliated entities. For all years,
we converted the answers into a dichotomous variable representing whether the
hospital itself offered the service. To ensure consistent coding, we compared the
responses in 1993, when the surveys included both question types. Second, the
data have missing values, particularly in the later years, with no obvious difference
between nonprofit and for-profit respondents. We imputed about 1 percent of the
observations for each service using data from the surrounding years. Third, in
approximately 83 hospitals, the self-reported variable for whether a hospital is a
general or specialty hospital was inconsistent across years. We recoded 183 cases
(about 0.5 percent of our estimation sample) using the modal response during all
sample years.
2. For each hospital in our sample in each year, we assign a weight to each other
hospital in the nation (including both urban and rural hospitals), weighting by its
admissions divided by the square of one plus a constant  the distance squared.
This method places more reasonable relative weights on points of different distances from the hospital than does the reciprocal of squared distance, and it does
not create a discontinuous drop in weight on neighbors from one to zero that using
geopolitical or other boundaries would. We fix the constant used in the weighting
such that the method yields similar results to those of actual patient markets. In
addition, we used a geodesic distance calculated using an accurate ellipsoidal
model of the earth’s surface. For more detail, see Horwitz and Nichols (2007, 2009).
3. In sensitivity testing, we confirmed that the results are not sensitive to the precise
definition of a for-profit market. For example, the results do not change appreciably if we define a for-profit market as one in which 10 percent of a hospital’s
competitors (weighted by distance and admissions) are for-profit.
4. To participate, hospitals must meet several criteria such as location in a rural
location at a specified distance from the nearest hospital, operating no more than
25 beds, maintaining a low-average length of stay (no more than 96 hours), or
designation as a ‘‘necessary provider’’ under a state waiver administered by the
CMS program (CMS 2009). As of June 2010, there were 1,315 critical access
hospitals (Flex Monitoring Team).
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5. However, participation does not seem to change either the mix of inpatient and
outpatient services or the balance between medical and surgical services within
hospitals (Schoenman and Sutton 2008; Li, Schneider, and Ward 2009).
6. We determined whether a hospital had CAH, SCH, or MDH status from the
Medicare cost reports, which indicates the beginning and end dates of payment
status. When a hospital had a CAH, SCH, or MDH payment status for more than
half the year, we coded the dummy variable as a one for that hospital-year
observation.
7. By varying only the corporate ownership and market type of each hospital, while
holding the other variables constant (at 1994 levels), we predict the probabilities
that each hospital in each year.
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